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A  general  equilibrium  model  of' optimal  employment  contracts  is 
developed  where  firms  have  better  information  abotu  labor's  mar- 
ginal product  than workers.  It is optimal  for the wage to be tied to 
the level of employment,  to prevent the firm from Flsely  stating that 
the marginal product  is low and cutting the wage. It is shown that an 
observed  aggregate  shock that leads to an interindustrv  shift in labor 
demand  and that would  have no effect  on  total eniplOVIllellt Ln(ler 
symmetric  information  leads  to  a  reduction  in  employment  when 
firms and  workers have asymmetric  information. 
I.  Introduction 
Recent  theories  of  the  business  cycle  have  emphasized  the  misalloca- 
tions  associated  with  unobserved  aggregate  shocks.'  Agents  are  as- 
sumed  to have  insufficient  information  to distinguish  changes  in theiv- 
relative  position  from  those  in  their  absolute  position.  Here  we  (le- 
velop  an  equilibrium  model  in which  an  aggregate  shock  (which,  e.g., 
1 See Barro (1 98 1) for a sLrvey of the literatUre on Unol)serve(l mllolleV suL)ply shocks, 
and Grossman and Weiss (1  982) for a model  with Unobserved real p)roducliCil  shocks. 
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affects  the  price  level  or  aggregate  unemployment)  is observed  by 
everyone.  However,  the  shock  increases  workers'  uncertainty  about 
their  marginal  value  products.  We show  that this increase  in uncer- 
tainty  causes  employment  to  fall  below  the  complete  information 
level. 
Grossman  and  Hart (1981)  and  Azariadis  (1983)  analyzed  the op- 
timal labor contract between  a firm and its workers in a partial equilib- 
rium  model  where  the  firm  has  better  information  than  workers 
about the  real profitability of employment.  If the firm is risk averse, 
optimal risk sharing implies that it should cut its real wage bill when it 
suffers  from low profitability. When the firm's profitability, i, is unob- 
servable to workers, however,  the wage bill cannot depend  directly on 
s. Instead, if the wage bill is to be reduced,  the firm will have to reduce 
employment  as "proof"' that labor's marginal  product  has  fallen.  In 
particular, the firm and workers will agree ex ante to a labor contract 
w(l; P) that ties the wage bill w to employment  1,  and the realization of' 
a random  variable P denoting  public information. 
Suppose  that  when  P  =  nj,  workers  have  complete  information 
about  their marginal  value  product,  while P =  n2  denotes  an aggre- 
gate shock that creates uncertainty  about the marginal value product 
of labor. When P =  nI, the optimal labor contract will involve produc- 
tive efficiency  (since  there  is complete  information),  and  hence  the 
marginal wage bill w1(l,  nI) and labor's marginal disutility of effort,  say 
R, will be equated.  On the other  hand, if n =  n1,  it can be shown that 
risk sharing dictates that w,(1,  n2) exceed R. Hence  there will be under- 
employment  in  low  marginal  product  firms  (but  there  will  not  be 
overemployment  in high  marginal  product  firms). This  implies  that 
total employment  will be lower when P  =  n2 than if information  were 
complete  or  labor  were  allocated  through  Walrasian  spot  markets. 
Consequently,  shocks that move the economy  from kiI to n2 but do not 
affect total employment  with complete  information  or with labor allo- 
cation  through  spot  markets  lower  total employment  when  there  is 
asymmetric  information. 
Section  II  reviews  optimal  asynmmetric  information  contracts  for  a 
single firm. Section  III  presents  an introductory  general  equilibrium 
model  in which an observed  economy-wide  shock affects the physical 
productivity  of' labor.  Workers  know  only  the  cross-sectional  distri- 
bution  of' productivities  across  firms  that  the  shock  induces.  For 
example,  workers may know that an oil price shock lowers labor pro- 
ductivity by 75 percent  in half the firms and raises it by 75 percent  in 
the other half. However,  a given worker does not know which half' his 
firm  is in.  This  captures  the  idea  that  workers  know  how  the  total 
demand  for  labor varies  with the  observed  shock  but not  how  their 
own firm's demand  for labor is affected  by the shock.  We show that UNEMPLOYMENT  909 
the relatively lucky firms do not increase employment  more than they 
would  if  their  workers  had  perfect  information,  while  the  unlucky 
firms decrease  employment  more  than  they  would  if their  workers 
had perfect  information. 
Section  IV extends  the analysis to demand  shocks. We consider  an 
economy  in which there  are three  final consumption  goods,  of' which 
two, X  and  Y, are  produced  from  intermediate  goods,  K1 and  K2, 
while the third is not produced  using current resources  (e.g., it repre- 
sents real balances or the capital stock). The  economy  is subjected  to 
two types of shocks, only one of' which is observable to workers. First, 
the  distribution  of  endowed  wealth  changes,  which  changes  the  de- 
mand  for  the  final  goods  X  and  Y. This  results  in  an  observable 
change  in prices of the final goods.  Second,  there  are shocks 0 to the 
technology  of' transforming  intermediate  goods  into  final  goods. 
These  shocks  are not  observed  by workers and  change  the  intensity 
with which  a particular  final goods  industry  uses  each  intermediate 
good.  Workers  produce  only  intermediate  goods  but do not observe 
intermediate  good  prices. 
When  workers  in a particular  intermediate  good  industry,  say in- 
dustry  1, observe a shock to the relative prices of X and Y, they do not 
know how that affects  their marginal value product,  because they do 
not  know  whether  X  or  Y is  intensively  using  the  output  K1 they 
produce.  Note,  however,  that  when  relative  prices  are not  very dis- 
persed,  it does  not matter as f'ar  as the workers' marginal value prod- 
uct is concerned  whether  X or  Y is using K1 intensively.  Tile  model, 
therefore,  has the  property  that an observed  increase  in the  disper- 
sion of relative final goods  prices causes an increase in the uncertainty 
workers  have  about  their  own  marginal  value  products.  This  situa- 
tion, where  each  worker knows more about general  economic  condi- 
tions than about conditions  in his own industry  (since each consumes 
goods  produced  in many industries),  is in contrast  to Lucas's (1972) 
assumption  that workers know more about their own firmns'  price than 
they know about  the economy-wide  price level. 
Using  the  results of' Sections  II and  III,  Section  IV shows that an 
increase  in the dispersion  of  relative  prices that leaves the  complete 
information  Walrasian  equilibrium  unchanged  causes  a  fall  in  em- 
ployment  under  asymmetric  information.  This  is proved  under  the 
assumption  that,  ex  ante,  workers  and  firms write an optimal  labor 
contract  that appropriately  is conditioned  on  everything  that will be 
observable  to  both  parties.  Therefore,  the  contractionary  effect  of 
aggregate  shocks  occurs  despite  the  fact  that  contracts  are  con- 
ditioned  on these  shocks. This is in contrast to models  such as Taylor 
(1980)  or  Blanchard  (1979)  where  observable  shocks  affect  output 
because  wage contracts  cannot  be conditioned  on  them. 910  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Section  V contains  our  interpretations,  conclusions,  and some  ref- 
erences  to evidence.  In particular we suggest  the importance  of' pub- 
licly observed  but unanticipated  changes  in the price level (or rate of' 
inflation)  in a monetary  economy.  When  a large  percentage  of  indi- 
vidual wealth is held  in the form of nominally  denominated  assets or 
liabilities, then changes  in the price level will cause a redistribution  of 
wealth between  nominal  borrowers and nominal  lenders.  This wealth 
redistribution  can be the source of' shocks to the relative demands  for 
goods  if  borrowers  and  lenders  have  different  tastes.  Output  can 
contract as a consequence  of an increase  in the relative price disper- 
sion created by the wealth redistribution.  A wealth redistribution  that 
would  have  no  effect  on  total  employment  when  agents  have  sym- 
metric information  will cause employment  to fall when they are asym- 
metrically informed. 
II.  The  Optimal  Employment  Contract 
We begin by analyzing  the optimal contract between  a single firm and 
its  workers.  For  now,  we  do  not  distinguish  physical  productivity 
shocks from  relative demand  shocks. Thus  we let ? represent  a shock 
to the marginal  value  product  of  labor; that is, output  q is given  by 
q  =  sf  (l),  ~~~~~(1) 
where I is total employment  in the firm, andf  is a production  function 
satisfying f'  >  0, f"  <  0, f'(0)  =  x,  and f'(oo)  =  0.  We regard  q as 
"real" output  or revenue. 
We adopt  a 2-period  model.  At initial date 0 the firm and workers 
have  the  same  information.  Neither  party  knows  s  (s  denotes  the 
realization of's), but both know the distribution of s. At date  1 the firm 
observes  s, but the  workers  do  not.  This  asymmetry  reflects the  rea- 
sonable  presumption  that  management  knows  more  about  relevant 
demand  and  cost conditions  than do  workers.  Because  of' the  asym- 
metry,  the  wage  bill cannot  depend  on  s directly  (if  the  firm  were 
asked  to  report  s,  it would  claim  the s that  minimized  total wages). 
However,  the workers and firm both observe I and some public infor- 
mation  n.  Hence  the  total  wage  bill w  can  depend  on  n  and  I. We 
assume  that q is not observed  by the workers. 
Labor is supplied  perfectly  elastically at a real wage rate of' R per 
unit at date  1; that is, a worker's utility of real income I and labor I is 
U(I  -  Rl), where  U' >  0 and U"  S  0. Let U be the expected  utility at 
time  0  that  a worker  at  this  firm  could  obtain  elsewhere.  We  shall 
suppose,  for simplicity, that the firm can hire only one worker (Gross- 
man and  Hart  [1981,  p. 304]  show that real values are unaffected  if 
the firm can have  many identical  workers). UNEMPLOYMENT  911 
An  optimal  contract  specifies  a wage  rule  w(l,  P)  and  an employ- 
ment  rule  1(?, P) that maximize  the  firm's expected  utility given  that 
the worker's expected  utility is at least U. Note  that since the worker 
cannot observe s directly, the contract must induce the firm to choose  l 
=  I(s, n), given w(l, n), when s  =  s and P  =  n. The  firm will do so if' 
sf[I(s,  n)]  -  w[I(s, n), n]  - sf(b  -  w(l, n)  (2) 
for  all s, 1, n; that is, if l(s, n)  maximizes  ex  post  profit  f'or the  firm 
at date  1 when s  =  s, P  =  n, given  the wage rule w(l, P).2 We assume 
that the owners of the firm are risk averse and have a utility of' profit 
V(q  -  w),  where  V is  strictly  concave.3  Thus  an  optimal  contract 
maximizes 
EV{sf[1(9, n)]  -  w[l(s,  n), P]}  (3) 
subject to (2) and 
E U{w [ l (s, n), n]  -R R (,  n)} ?  U.  (4) 
Expectations  are taken with respect to the joint distribution of'?s  and ii, 
which is assumed  to be known to both the firm and worker at time 0. 
If  the  worker  could  observe  s, then  an optimal  employment  con- 
tract would set the marginal value product of labor equal to the value 
of the marginal disutility of effort R and choose  the wage bill to share 
risk optimally  between  the firm and the worker. We denote  this com- 
plete  information  employment  rule by 1*(9),  where 
sf'[l*(s)]  =  R  f'or all s.  (5) 
Grossman  and  Hart  (1981)  showed  that  when  the  worker  has no 
information  n about  the  realization  of' s,  the  optimal  employment 
function  I(s) is everywhere  below  I*(s) except  at the  highest  s. This 
result extends  to the case where  workers can observe  n at time  1. In 
the following  proposition,  [s(n), s-(n)] denotes  the support  of' the con- 
ditional  distribution  of' s given  n. 
2 It is sometimes  convenient  to express  a contract as a  pair [Z(s-,  i),  I(.S-.  fi)] with the 
property  that  for  all  s,  .s,  it 
y/T1(g,  t)]  -  U)(S ?1  f  -_ sl[I(s,  11)] -  z(s,  i).  (2*) 
This  formulation  is  equivalent  to  (2')  in  the  text  because  from  (2*)  w(si,  it)  =  w(s2,, ,t) 
whenever  I(sj,  to) =  1(S2,  to);  i.e.,  uw(s,  it)  depends  on  .s only  through  1. That  we  mnaN  use 
this  alternative  expression  is an  instance  of' the  revelation  principle  (see  DasgUlpta, 
Hammond,  and  Maskin  1979;  Myerson  1979;  or  Harris  and  Towusendl  1981).  Ine- 
qualities  (2)  and  (2*)  are  often  called  incentive  or  self-selection  con0straints. 
"  The  assumption  that we can treat the firm as risk averse makes sense if'either (()  the 
owners cannot  diversify  away the riskiness of their shares  in  the firm or (b) the firm is 
run by a risk-averse manager  who  suppplies an  ullObservetl  in1)ut  (e.g.,  "entrepreneurial 
effort") and whose  salary depends  on the firm's performance.  Folr  elaborations  of the 
second  justification,  see  HolHastror  an  Weissr(l1  X2)  and  I  latt  (1I983). 912  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
PROPOSITION  1.  If  101(s,  n)  and  w('(1, n)  form  an optimal  contract, 
that is, maximize  (3) subject to (2) and (4), then 10(s,  n)  <  1*(s) for all s 
and n, with equality if s  =  s(n).  Furthermore,  if', for each n, either  (a) 
the conditional  distribution  of s is continuous  or (b) it is discrete  and 
the worker is risk neutral,  then  1"(s,  n) <  1*(s) almost surely for those 
realizations  s less than T(n).4 
The  first part of proposition  1 is established in Hart (1983).  Part b is 
also proved there, while a follows from an application of the results of 
Grossman  and  Hart (1981). 
To  illustrate this proposition,  suppose  that fi takes on two possible 
values, nI and n2. Assume that when n  =  n  I,  s  =  sI always,  so there is 
no uncertainty;  whereas when n  =  n2,  s  can assume two values _  and s. 
Clearly the conditionally  optimal  contract  for n  =  n1 entails efficient 
employment,  l*(sl),  since there  is no uncertainty.  On the other  hand, 
when n  =  n2,  1(s, n2)  <  I*(s)  (assuming  risk neutrality for the worker) 
by proposition  1. 
To  understand  proposition  1 in  this case,  suppose  instead  that  a 
labor contract  induced  the  full  information  employment  rule,  1*(s). 
From the incentive  constraint  (2), 
f [1*(S)]  -  W(S)  S- f[1*(s)]  -  Z(S).  (2') 
The  difference  in the firm's profit across the two states is 
arc -  r1  =  Tf [1*(s)]  -  w(s)  -  {sf[1*(s)]  -  w(s)},  (2") 
which, by (2'), is positive,  since /*(s)  >  1*(s). Thus  the firm bears risk. 
Now  if (2') held  with strict inequality,  we could  raise w(s) and lower 
w(s)  to  keep  the  mean  wage  the  same.  This  would  not  affect  the 
worker if he were risk neutral but would help the firm by reducing  its 
risk. Hence  (2')  must  hold  with equality  (it is immediate  that, if' [2'] 
holds  with  equality,  the  other  incentive  constraint  for s  s holds). 
From (2') and (2"), it is clear that the only way to reduce -r2 -  I while 
still  maintaining  (2') with equality is to reduce 1(s) below 1*(s) and raise 
w(s)  -  w(s).  Moreover,  such  a  change  is  desirable,  assuming  the 
worker is risk neutral, since the consequent  loss of output  is a second- 
order  effect  (starting  from  efficiency)  but the  gain  in risk reduction 
for the firm is of the first order.  Note also that since deviations  in 1(s) 
from  l*(s)  do  not affect  'T2 -  7l,  it is optimal  to set 1(s)  =  1*(s). 
For the  remainder  of  the  paper,  when  applying  proposition  1, we 
shall suppose  that either  case a or case b holds. 
Risk neutrality  of  the  worker  is a stronger  assum11ption1  than  is necessary.  All that 
is required  is that the  worker be not too risk averse. UNEMPLOYMENT  913 
III.  General  Equilibrium  with  Physical 
Productivity  Shocks 
We now embed  the  partial equilibrium  model  of  Section  II in a very 
simple  general  equilibrium  model  of contracts.  In this model  aggre- 
gate shocks affect  the  marginal  physical productivity  of labor. 
As in Section  II, each  firm i has a production  function 
q=  si  (1).  (6) 
We imagine  that there is a steady state for the economy  in which firms 
earn  no  rents.  In  this  steady  state,  all  firms  find  labor  equally 
profitable; that is, s1 =S  =  ...  =  s*. Now imagine that the economy 
is hit by a shock that induces  a nondegenerate  distribution  of's across 
firms. We assume that the owner of each firm knows his own s but that 
his worker  knows  only  the  cross-sectional  distribution  of  s. Lacking 
any  further  knowledge,  each  worker  assumes  that  his  firm's s is a 
random  drawing  from  that distribution. 
In the notation  of the previous  section,  let P be the signal observed 
by firms and  workers  about  the  economy-wide  shock.  Let F(son)  be 
the  cross-sectional  distribution  of' productivities  associated  with  the 
realization P =  n. Denote  the news that no shock has occurred  by h = 
n*; that is, this is the steady state where s, = s* for all i. We assume that 
every  n 5  n* leads  to a nondegenerate  distribution  of s in the sense 
that 
var (s]n) >  0  for all it #4 n*.  (7) 
It  is  useful  to  consider  the  Walrasian  (or  complete  information) 
employment  level associated  with a particular cross-sectional distribu- 
tion of g. A firm with si =  s sets 
sf'(1*)  =  R.  (8) 
This  defines  the  employment  level  1*(s). Thus  for  a  given  cross- 
sectional  distribution  F(sln),  economy-wide  employment  is 
relit) 
L*(n)  =  1*  (s)dF (s In),  (9) 
where s(n)  and Ts(n)  are the bounds  on the realization of's.  Note  that 
for the no-shock  situation,  total employment  is 
L*--L*(n*)  =  1*(s*)N,  (10) 
where N is the  number  of  firms. 
Suppose  now that the worker in firm i can observe  ,.  and n but not si. 
Appealing  to proposition  1 of Section  II, we see that when  the cross- 914  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
sectional  distribution  of  s  is  not  degenerate,  employment  fO(s,  n) 
satisfies 
10(s, n) <  1*(s)  for s <  s(n)  (11) 
almost  surely.  Hence  the  economy's  total employment  under  asym- 
metric information  is 
L0(n)  =  1  /0(s, n)dF(srn)  <j  1*(s)dF(sjn) = L*(n)  for all n #4  n*. 
(12) 
On the other  hand, 
LO(n*) -  L*(n*)  =  L*,  (13) 
since  the  asymmetry  of' information  is irrelevant  when  there  is no 
shock. 
Using  (12) and (13) we may compare  the asymmetric and full infor- 
mation  employment  levels.  In  the  steady  state,  total  employment 
equals  L*  under  both  symmetric  and  asymmetric  information.  As- 
sume  now  that a shock  hits the  economy  inducing  a nondegenerate 
cross-sectional  distribution  of f.  In general,  some firms gain from this 
shock  while  others  lose.  The  lucky  firms  will  raise  employment, 
whereas  the losers  will diminish  it. 
If the move from  n* to n causes total Walrasian employment  to fall 
below  L*,  (12)  and  (13)  imply  that,  under  asymmetric  information, 
the  decline  in  total  employment  is greater,  that  is,  it is  multiplied. 
On the other  hand,  if total Walrasian employment  rises when n* goes 
to  n  the  increase  must  be  smaller  under  asymmetric  information; 
there  is a "divider" effect.  Finally, any  movement  from  n* to n that 
keeps the total level of' Walrasian employment  constant  will lead to a 
decrease  in aggregate  employment  under  asymmetric  information. 
We see,  therefore,  that the effect  of the asymmetry of information 
is itself  asymmetric  between  "up shocks" and  "down shocks" (where 
these are defined  relative to total Walrasian employment).  In the case 
of  down  shocks,  the  fall  in  Walrasian  employment  is  exacerbated, 
whereas  in the  case of  up  shocks  the  rise is diminished.  The  model 
thus contrasts  with that of  Lucas (1972),  in which  asymmetric  infor- 
mation  has  a  (symmetric)  multiplier  effect  on  both  up  and  down 
shocks. 
Note  that  there  is some  reason  to believe  that the  non-Walrasian 
effects  of our model  will be short run.  For if the shock is permanent, 
there  should  be a flow of  resources  from  adversely  affected  firms or 
industries  to beneficially  affected  ones.  This  reallocation  will tend  to 
equalize  the  profitability of  labor, returning  the economy  to a steady 
state. UNEMPLOYMENT  915 
IV.  Relative  Demand  Shocks 
We next  study  uncertainty  caused  by relative  demand  shocks.  Such 
uncertainty  is more  difficult  to formalize  than that from productivity 
shocks. The  additional  complication  is rewarded,  however, by a richer 
model.  Moreover,  relative demand  shocks are arguably more impor- 
tant in practice as a source  of' uncertainty. 
One  possible  cause  of' relative  demand  shocks  is redistribution  of' 
wealth  (induced,  perhaps,  by unanticipated  changes  in inflation).  If' 
workers do not know how a shift in demand  affects their own firm, a 
redistribution  of' wealth  may  increase  their  uncertainty  about  their 
marginal  value  product.  This  uncertainty  may  cause  a  decline  in 
aggregate  employment  relative  to the Walrasian level. 
There  are a number of' difficulties in f`ornmalizing  this idea. First, the 
process  we are trying  to capture  is intrinsically dynanaic: a demand 
shift  alters  prices,  which  in turn  influence  employment,  which  then 
further  affects  demand,  and  so on.  Ideally,  we should  use  an inter- 
temporal,  monetary  model.  Instead,  ours is nonmionetary  and static. 
Second,  there is a special problem with modeling  shocks to demand 
rather than to productivity,  namely,  that if' firms  operate  in  competi- 
tive product markets, the demand  they face is completely  summarized 
by the relative prices of their products.  If'  workers buy these products, 
they cannot  have imperfect  information  about their firm's demand.9 
To  get  around  this problem,  we assume  that some  firms produce 
intermediate  goods  at prices that consumers  do  not observe.  Thus  a 
worker does  not  know how  a change  in the demiianid  f'or a final con- 
sumption  good  affects  the  demand  for  the  particular  interiiiediate 
good  produced  by his firm. All he  knows is that his firni's price is a 
random  drawing  from  the  current  cross-sectional  distribution  of  all 
intermediate  good  prices. 
Consider  a competitive  economy  with two produced  consumption 
goods X and Y and two intermediate  goods KI and K >.  There  is also an 
unproduced  third consumption  good Z. There  are firms that produce 
good K1 (type 1 firms) and others that produce  good Kit  (type 2 firnis). 
Both  types  have  the  same  concave,  differentiable  production  ftulc- 
tion,f(l),  where  I is labor input,  as in Section  II. Goods X and  Y are 
produced  without  labor  according  to  the  linear  production 
5If  there are no futures  markets, and labor at time t is  usecl to produce  goods at tillme 
t +  1, then  it might  appear  that workers and  firms could  have  different  information 
about the value of employing  labor at t. However,  if the workers' wage at late  t +  I clan 
depend  on  the date t +  1 spot prices that the firm learns at t, then one  call showm  that 
employment  in an optimal contract is the same as if both the firm and workers ob)servred 
the date t +  1 spot  price at date  t. 916  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
technologies 
X  (1  -  0)K,  + 0K2  (14) 
Y =OK  +  (1  -  0)K2,  (15) 
where  0 is the  realization  of  a random  variable 0. We assume  that 0 
takes two values: 
l/2  +  b  with probability  l'(2 
1/2  -  b  with probability '/2, 
where 0 < b <  '/2. When 0 >  '/2,  industry Y finds K, a more productive 
input than K2, while industry  X finds the opposite  true. The  roles are 
reversed  when  0 <  '/2. We will see that, when  0 >  '2,,  industry Y uses 
only K,,  and industry  X uses only K2. Thus,  when 0 >  '2,  an increase 
in the final demand  for X relative to Y is beneficial  for type 2 firms, 
whereas  when  0 <  '/2  it is adverse.  That  is, the  benefits  that  inter- 
mediate  good  firms derive  from changes  in final demand  depend  on 
the realization  of  0. 
We normalize  the  price  of  the  third consumption  good  Z to be  1. 
For the rest of this section all prices are measured  in terms of Z. Let vi 
be the price of intermediate  good  K,. Let P  and P. be the prices of X 
and  Y, respectively. 
There  are two cases to consider: 
CASE  1:  0  <  1/2.  In this case, 
10  <  I  0  (17) 
If vJ2/vJ1  >  (1  -  0)0,  neither  consumption  good  industry will demand 
K.,.  But, as will become  clear, a positive  quantity of K2 is always sup- 
plied,  a contradiction  of  equilibrium.  Similarly,  V2/V1  <  0/(1  -  0) is 
also impossible.  Hence 
0  I"'?  1 -  0  (18) 
1  -  0  V,  0 
and industries  X and Y specialize  inl K, and K,), respectively. Competi- 
tion implies that if X and Y are produced  their prices must equal unit 
resource  costs: 
VI =  xP(1  -  0)  =  PX  2  +  b ,v=  P,(1  -0)  =  1  +  b  (19) 
CASE  2:  0 >  '/2. Symmetrically,  we have 
10  S  0  (20) 
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and 
l=  p, 0  =  Pj4-  +  b  Po  i0  =  (--  +  b)  (21) 
Notice  that  the  cross-sectional  distribution  of' final good  prices  is 
mirrored  by  the  cross-sectional  distribution  of' intermediate  good 
prices.  A worker  who  observes  the  prices  (P,  F)  and  has only  this 
information  views his own  firm's price v as a random  drawing  from 
the distribution 
[P,(.5  +  b)  with probability  1/2 
v=  (22) 
P,(.5  +  b)  with probability  1',2. 
Thus  the worker can make good  inferences  about his own firm's price 
if the dispersion  of P, and P, is small but correspondingly  poor inf'er- 
ences  for large dispersions.(i 
We next  study  optimal  labor contracts between  firms and workers 
in the intermediate  good  industries.  To  (1o so we first specify  agents' 
preferences. 
Workers  and Firms in the Intermediate  Good Industries 
There  are m intermediate  good  firms and m workers. All workers are 
identical  and  have  ordinal  preferences  represented  by  the  utility 
function  XIY2ZX'Z  -  RL, where R is the marginal disutility of' effort, 
X.  -  0  f'or all i, and  X,  +  X,  +  XA =  1. Workers' risk llef'erences 
are  represented  by the  concave  von  Neeumann-Morgenstern  utility 
function  U,  so  their  utility  over  consumption  is  U(XXIYA'ZX, 
-  RL).  Collectively,  they  have  endowment  e1,,  of' the  nonproduced 
good  Z. Firms' owners  (we identify  firms with their owners)  have the 
same  tastes f'or consumption  goods  as workers;  they  have the  utility 
functions XIYAX2ZX'`.  They have the strictly concave  von  Neulmiann- 
Morgenstern  utility  function  V,  and  so  their  overall  utility  is 
V(XX'yX2ZX3).  Owners  have an aggregate  endowment  el of' the unpro- 
6  We  want  to  model  the  ideal that  workers  know  general  labor- iaarket  conditions 
better  than  conditions  in  their  own firlm1.  lHiLs  workers  observe  the  cross-sectiomal 
mnean  and variance of' eml)llment  fiom-  newspaper  reports on tihe ec()oIamny-widle and 
regional  unemplovmeni tates.  They  d(0 not knowv  the  state of'  demandl  for  their  owVIn 
firm's proct.LvC  Further,  if there  are manN,  firms in a given  indmmtryy,  then  the empfi)V- 
ment level of'other  identical firms will provide a useful signal to workers in a given firnm. 
We  alsuSme  that  t0  suchusignal  is  available.  To  the  extent  that  firms  in  the  same  indusItrV  are 
not completely  identical but are subject to idiosynlcratic shocks to demandl, the employ- 
ment level of'other  firms in the same inadnLstry  ma'y  be a poot-  signal about a given firm's 
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duced  good.  Aggregate  worker  and  firm demand  for X and  Y is 
X=  (I  +  I-)),  yd  =  '2  (I  + 
I,)  (23) 
Px  P'V 
3 
where  IW  and  IF  are  the  aggregate  incomes  for  workers  and  firm 
owners,  respectively.  Define  8- =  'I-23*.  Then  the  indirect utility 
functions  of  workers  and  firms are, respectively, 
U|  8  n__-  -  RI),  V(  Px  P2  4).  (24) 
The  aggregate  income  of workers and owners together  automatically 
nets out wage payments,  so it equals total income  from sales of inter- 
mediate  goods  plus aggregate  endowment  of the nonproduced  good 
Z: 
II, +  IF  =  vIK1  +  v2K2  +  el  +  ez.,  =  PxX +  PI Y +  e1 +  e,,.  (25) 
We model  the economy  as if there were two dates, 0 and  1. At date 
o the workers and  firms meet  according  to some competitive  process 
to sign contracts.  From the equal numbers  assumption  each firm em- 
ploys one  worker. Everyone  knows the distributions,  but not the real- 
izations, of 0, Px, and PT.  Since the distribution of 0 is symmetric about 
1/2,  workers are indifferent  between  signing  contracts with K1 and K2 
firms. Let #1  denote  (INx  Pi).  Then  workers and firms write a contract 
that makes the wage bill paid at date  1 a function  w(l, #1).  At date  1 the 
firm observes n and its own price v and chooses  1, whereas the worker 
observes  only  I and  n. 
Other  Consumers 
There  are other  consumers  who neither  work nor own intermediate 
goods  firms. The  only source of wealth these consumers  have is their 
(random)  aggregate  endowment  j(  of  the  nonproduced  good.  They 
have  Cobb-Douglas  utility  functions  but  with  parameters  different 
from  those  of  firms and  workers,  namely,  'Y1,  DY2,  Y3. Their  demands 
are 
xd  -Y  eyd  -  Y2e(6  0  Px e  P  e(-  (26) 
The  only role of  the other  consumers  is to generate  changes  in rela- 
tive prices  when  the  wealth  distribution  changes.  We could  alterna- 
tively  have  considered  a  wealth  redistribution  between  firms  and 
workers, but it is more difficult  to characterize the optimal labor con- 
tract  when  workers  and  firms  have  different  tastes  for  consumer 
goods. UNEMPLOYMENT  919 
Equilibrium 
Let e  (e1, eZV,  e(). In equilibrium,  consumption  prices n -(PO,  P.) are 
functions  of e. In turn, intermediate  goods  prices, from (19) and (21), 
are functions  of n and 0. Thus,  given  the distribution  of  fi and 0, the 
optimal  labor  contract  [w?(l, fi),  Q(fi5,  fi)]  for  firms  in  industry  i 
maximizes 
EV{vif[ i(vi, n)] -wi[li(z,,  i4), fi] +  (e,/m)}  (27) 
subject to the constraints  that l(v,,  n) maximizes 
vif  (1i)  -  wzi(lI,,  n),  (28) 
for all n and v, and 
wlif,,  i),  il]  +  (ez,/Im)  _ 
EU.'['''  )  l  -  RRii,(  RP,,  Fi)  :  U.  (29) 
The  expectations  in (27) and (29) are taken ex ante over the prospec- 
tive market-clearing  prices Px(e), P,(e),  and vl(e,  0), Zv2(e, 0). Because 
firms in the  two intermediate  goods  industries  are ex  ante  identical, 
we will henceforth  drop  the subscript i and refer  to the optimal con- 
tract as a pair w(l, n),  l(v,  n).7 
In equilibrium  Px and P, must clear spot markets at date  1. In view 
of  (23),  (25), and  (26), we have 
x 
(PxX  +  P)yY  +  el +  ezt,)  +  l  e() =  X  (30a) 
and 
p  (PxX  +  py Y +  e1 +  ezt) +  eY2  e-  Y,  (30b) 
Py  P_ 
where X and Y are outputs  of the two produced  goods.  Manipulating 
(30a) and  (30b) yields 
X  =  Ex,  ET  =  _,(31) 
Px,  P 'V 
where Ex and Ey are given  by8 
Ex =  (ef + e.,)K (Al +  X2)  +  Ali  + eoK'  (YI  +  Y2)  +  (32a) 
7 It is not difficult to show that under our assunmptions  the optimal contract is unique. 
8 Note that when K,  =  -y for all i, changes  in the distribution  of wealth have no effect 
on E, or E, and so none  on  prices. 920  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
(  +)  (  1  +  eX2) +  X2  (Y  +  Y2)  +  Y1 .(32b) 
Let  l,  and  1y  be  employment  in  the  intermediate  good  industries 
supplying  industries  X and  Y, respectively.  Then,  from  (22), 
,  =  )+ b)Px, n1 l  =  2  +  b)P- , n.  (33) 
Outputs  X and  Y are given  by 
X  =  (  1 -  0)K1  =  (1  -  )(l),  Y =  (  1  -  0)K=  (1  -  0), 
if  0  <  '/2,  and 
X  OK2  0 f (l),  Y  K=  0  / 
if  0  >  '/2.  Since  0  =/2  -  b or  /<) +  b, this simplifies  to 
X  +  b)f(1b  Y  I(  +  b  f(1).  (34) 
Combining  (31) and  (34) gives us 
(.5  +  b)f(1?)  =  and  (.5  +  b)/'((1X) =V  (35) 
Conditions  (22),  (27)-(29),  and  (33)-(35)  characterize  a contract 
equilibrium  under  asymmetric  informnation. To  summarize  the  fea- 
tures of  this equilibrium,  a price function  P(e)  =  [Pi (e), Pi(e-)] maps 
each realization of the random endowment  vector e  (el, ez,,  e)  into a 
pair of  prices.  This  function  determines  intermediate  goods  prices 
vl(e, 0), Zv2(e,  0) according  to (22). Given these price functions,  optimal 
labor contracts maximize (27) subject to (28) and (29). These  contracts 
determine  output  through  (33) and (34). Finally, for the system to be 
in equilibrium,  these supplies  must clear markets, that is, satisfy (35).i) 
It is useful  by contrast  to examine  the  Walrasian equilibrium  as a 
function  of E  (E', En).  Walrasian wages in each industry are equal 
to marginal  value  products  of labor. This  implies  that the Walrasian 
equilibrium  prices  and  employment  levels,  ZIX,  zl,  Px, PX, k,  l,? satisfy 
8  (/x)  =  8 Px(.5  +  b)f'(/xj  R;  (36) 
IP2  j  xIPX2 
We must also add the condition  that U**  U  l  U*, where U* is the le  el of Litilitv  at 
which a firm is indifferent  between  signing  a contract with a worker alt(1 not operating 
at all, and  U** is the level of  uLtilitv  at which a worker is inldifferent  between  signing  a 
contract  with a  firm and  not  working;  i.e.,  =  =  EL[8f-  ""pi  Jm)].  Equilirlium 
depends, in general, on  the particular vatlue  U (not, however, if' U and V exhibit constant 
absolute  risk aversion;  see Grossman  and  Hart  1983).  It caln be shown  that a contract 
equilibo ium exists. 
Alternatively,  we could  examine  the contract equilibrium,1  1 with  com1l)lete  informa- 
tion. Stich an equilibrium  gives  rise  to the  Walrasian emplomillent levels. UNEMPLOYMENT  921 
bef'  (IV)  _  6Pv(.5  +  b)J  (1X) -  R;  (37) 
j1Xj52  P~Ij5X2  x  'Yx 
X  (.5  +  b)f  (/x)  (38) 
Px 
E 
Y  =  (.5  +  b)f(1)  9  _;  (39) 
where  (38)  and  (39)  are  the  market-clearing  conditions  for  the  two 
produced  goods  industries  (see the derivation  of  [31]). 
We  now  apply  proposition  1 to  the  asymmetric  information  con- 
tract equilibrium.  For a given realization of i= (P=,  Pi), there will be 
a  "lucky" intermediate  goods  industry  (one  whose  output  price  is 
high) and an "unlucky" industry (i.e., if Px >  Pi, industry 2 is lucky if 0 
>  ?/2 and unlucky if 0 <  ?2 and conversely  for industry  1). One differ- 
ence  between  (27)-(29)  and  (2)-(4)  is  that  workers  and  firms  are 
interested  in real income  P1P2p)  rather than in I. Given that Pa, PR 
are  publicly  observable,  however,  proposition  1 generalizes  to  this 
case (for details, see Hart [ 1983]). Hence,  we may conclude  that a firm 
in the lucky industry  will equate  the marginal value product  of labor 
and  the  marginal  disutility  of' effort,  whereas  a firm in the  unlucky 
industry  will set  the  marginal  product  of  labor above  the  marginal 
disutility  of  effort.  Specifically,  when,  say,  P,  -  PX, employment 
satisfies 
X  's(.5  +  b)f'(lx)  =  R  (40) 
pX  IPX2 
x  V 
&  '^  (.5  +  b)f'(1v)  =  R(1  +  a),  (41) 
x  X 
where  (x  o  0,  and  cx =  0  if and  only  if PI  =  Pi.  Thus,  the  crucial 
difference  between  the asymmetric  information  and Walrasian equi- 
librium conditions  is the  (x in (41). 
We now show that if the distribution  of  wealth induces  prices that 
create  uncertainty  for  workers  about  their  marginal  value  products, 
then total employment  is lower than with complete  information.  Fur- 
thermore,  the  prices  of  both  produced  goods  are  higher  and  the 
outputs  are lower than  their  Walrasian levels.1 I 
" Note that if a monetary  contraction  causes  the change in the distribution  of wealth, 
then prices of goods relative to the nonproduced good (money)  will fall rather than 
rise. An implication  of our result is that the decreasee  in stipply associated with the 
increased  uncertainty  will cause prices in terms of money to fall less than they would 
under complete information. 922  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
PROPOSITION  2.  Consider  a Walrasian equilibrium  with prices PX, 
Pv satisfying Px >  P. and employment  levels l1x,.  The  corresponding 
asymmetric  information  contract equilibrium PX P  1  satisfies PX  > 
PXm  Ry  >  Pi,  lx <  Ix, and  1v  <  1X. 
PROOF:  Comparing  (31) with (38) and  (39) shows that it suffices  to 
prove  that Px  >  PX and  P.  >  Pi.  Suppose  one  of  these  inequalities 
failed.  Define P =  PXl  P  P'l  P V 
CASE  a.  P.  -  P  . The  market-clearing  conditions  (38) and (3 1) yield 
1x  >  1. Thus,  the marginal productivity conditions  (40) and (36) imply 
that 
Px  Px  (2  P  X  ~~~~1_  PX ~  ~42) 
P  p 
But since PX  Px, (42) implies  that P'  ,  P.  Market clearing  requires 
that output  of  Y be higher  in the contract equilibrium,  so 1, >  1. But 
the  marginal  conditions  (37) and  (41) then  imply that 
PV  > 
5 
Pa  ft*  PX(43) 
P  P 
Now  raise  (42)  to the  power  X1, (43)  to the  power  X2, and  multiply. 
This  yields P  >  P,  which  is inconsistent  with PX  S  Px  P_  V  Pil. 
CASE  b: P., S  Pa. Market clearing  implies that 1, :  1,. Then  (41) and 
(37) imply that P/,IP ?  Ps/P. This gives Px -  P,  The contradiction  now 
follows  exactly  as in case a. Q.E.D. 
Notice  that although  only  one  intermediate  goods  industry  is un- 
lucky in the sense of setting marginal product above marginal disutil- 
ity, both are unlucky in suffering  employment  levels below the Walra- 
sian  level.  Thus,  there  is  something  resembling  a  multiplier  that, 
through  general  equilibrium  effects,  transforms  the  sub-Walrasian 
output  and  employment  of one  sector into a general  "recession." 
As in Section III, proposition  2 implies that, if we start in the steady 
state PX =  PX, (1) a demand  shock  that creates  price dispersion  and 
keeps total Walrasian employment  constant  will reduce  total employ- 
ment under  asymmetric  information;  (2) a shock that reduces  Walra- 
sian employment  will reduce  employment  under  asymmetric  infor- 
mation by more; and (3) a shock that increases Walrasian employment 
will increase  employment  under  asymmetric  information  by less. 
We see that changes  in the distribution  of wealth will cause relative 
price  movements,  which  create  uncertainty  on  the  part of  laborers 
12  We must  emphasize  that proposition  2 depends  importantly  on  the  ordinal  (i.e., 
Cobb-Douglas)  preferences  we  have  assumed  (although  we could  have  assumed  any 
number  of  goods).  The  result  generalizes  to utility functions  Over  X,  Y, and  Z  of  the 
form  ?(X,  Y)AZ  I  -,  where  goods  X and  Y are gross complements. UNEMPLOYMENT  923 
about  their  marginal  value  product.  We  have  used  the  convention 
that unequal  final goods  prices are associated  with uncertainty  about 
the marginal value product  of labor within each industry. To see that 
this is just a convention,  note  that in a world of perfect  certainty free 
entry  leads  resources  to be allocated  across industries  in such  a way 
that prices  are  determined  by minimum  average  costs.  When  firms 
have identical  production  functions,  minimum  average  costs are the 
same.  If  we  instead  began  with  industries  that  had  different  cost 
functions,  then  the  steady-state  (no  shock)  situation  would  lead  to 
final goods  prices that are unequal.  However,  the profitability of labor 
would  be equalized  across industries.  A shock  that changed  relative 
demands  would,  in  the  short  run,  cause  the  profitability  of  hiring 
labor to be unequal  across industries.  If workers knew only the (distri- 
bution of profitabilities across industries  and they thought  their firm's 
labor  profitability  were  a  random  drawing  from  that  distribution, 
then a shock that changed  demand  from its steady-state value would 
cause  uncertainty  about  labor  productivity  within  each  industry.  By 
the arguments  of this section,  this would cause a drop in employment 
relative to the  Walrasian level. 
V.  Evidence  and  Conclusions 
A.  Relative Price Variability  as a Cause ou/Aggregate 
Output Variability 
In Section IV we outlined  a model in which relative price shocks inake 
workers  uncertain  about  their  marginal  value  products.  Firms have 
superior  information  about  marginal  products  but  are  risk averse; 
when  the  profitability  of  employing  labor  in a given  firm  is low,  it 
would  like  to  reduce  the  wage  bill.  Because  of  the  asymmetry  of' 
information,  it cannot  do  this directly  but must also reduce  the em- 
ployment  level  to  persuade  workers  that  their  marginal  products 
really are low. 
Before  discussing  potential  sources for the relative price shocks, we 
offer  some  evidence  that is consistent  with the  implication  that rela- 
tive  price  shocks  affect  aggregate  output.  Note  that  proposition  2 
implies  that  relative  demand  shocks  which  leave  employment  un- 
changed  under  full information  will lower employment  under  asym- 
metric information.  Thus,  assuming  that, on average,  the actual rela- 
tive demand  shocks  that  impact  on  our  economy  would  be  neutral 
under symmetric information,  our major empirical implication  is that 
aggregate  employment  will fall,  on  average,  in response  to  relative 
demand  shocks. 
Lilien  (1982)  has  presented  evidence  that  the  level  of  unemploy- 924  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ment  tends  to be high  when  the cross-sectional  variability of net em- 
ployment  is high.  He  found  that the cross-sectional  variability of em- 
ployment  can explain  at least as much  of  the  unemployment  as can 
unanticipated  decreases  in the  money  supply.  Unfortunately,  Lilien 
does  not examine  the  relationship  between  relative price shocks and 
the cross-sectional  variability of  net employment. 
Fischer (1982)  surveys the literature on relative price variability. He 
also  studies  the  time-series  behavior  of  aggregate  output,  relative 
price variability, and other macroeconomic  variables. In a vector auto- 
regression,  relative  price  variability,  when  "put  first," explains  as 
much of the variability of output  as interest  rate, money,  or inflation 
innovations  (see  his  table  8),  that  is,  about  10  percent  of' the  total 
variability  of' output.  When  relative  price  variability  is  "put  after" 
interest  rates,  money,  and  inflation,  it does  as well as inflation  and 
money  but worse  than  interest  rates. 
The  comparatively  high  explanatory  power  of' relative  price  vari- 
ability for output  is, of course, consistent  with models other than ours. 
For  example,  all  Fischer's  results  are  consistent  with  a  Walrasian 
model in which agents  receive information  that future output  will fall 
but that components  of output  will fall in differing  proportions.  With 
a conventional  money  demand  model  this implies that prices will rise 
in the future in differing  proportions,  in turn raising present prices in 
differing  proportions.  Thus,  the  future  decrease  in output  induces 
increases  in  expected  inflation,  variability of' inflation,  and  nominal 
interest rates, which is exactly what Fischer finds. Fischer also suggests 
three  other  models  that are consistent  with his observations. 
B.  The Causes of Relative Price Variability 
The  model  presented  in Section  IV assumes  that a shift in the distri- 
bution of wealth creates a change  in relative prices. There  are clearly 
many  sources  of  relative  price  variability other  than  changes  in the 
distribution  of' wealth,  for  example,  variability in technology,  tastes, 
and  the  prices  of' imports  and  exports.  We  have  focused  on  wealth 
redistribution  to allow for comparisons  with existing  macroeconomic 
models. 
In particular,  assume  that there  is a wealth  redistribution  between 
nominal  borrowers  and  lenders  after an unanticipated  movement  in 
the  price level.  (Although  our  model  has no money,  it would  not be 
difficult  to append  an additively  separable  utility of' real balances  to 
preferences.  Furthermore,  we  could  model  borrowing  and  lending 
associated either with life-cycle effects or random shocks to income. I 3) 
13 See Grossman  and Weiss (1  982) f'or an example  of a mlechlallical  tralbrlno,0omation  of 
an  asymmetric  information  real  economy  to  a  nominal  eCOnOmy'. An  almost  identical UNEMPLOYMENT  925 
In such a model  with nominal  borrowing  and lending,  unanticipated 
inflation  has important  effects  on  the distribution  of' wealth. 
In the United  States, 50 percent  of'"wealth" is held  in the form of' 
nominal  debt.'  If the economy  is composed  of' two types of' individ- 
uals, nominal borrowers  and lenders,  who share other wealth equally, 
then a 10 percent  permanent  drop in the price level increases the real 
wealth of lenders  by 50 percent  of' 10 percent,  or 5 percent.  Borrow- 
ers' wealth  falls by the  same  amount.  To  the extent  that the  perma- 
nent drop  of  10 percent  in the price level is associated with expected 
deflation,  there will be a second  effect  in the wealth distribution  in the 
same direction.  Namely,  the real price of long-term  nominal  debt will 
rise due  to the decrease  in the nominal  interest  rate. People  over  55 
(the "old") tend  to be  nominal  creditors  while  people  under  55  (the 
"young") tend  to be nominal  debtors.  Fischer and  Modigliani  (1978) 
estimate  (to within an order  of magnitude)  that a 1 percent  unantici- 
pated increase  in the price level will transfer wealth with a flow value 
of' about  1 percent  of  GNP. 
Wealth redistributions  have no effect  on relative prices if' wealth is 
redistributed  between  groups  that have the same homothetic  pref'er- 
ences.  However,  there  is some  evidence  that there are systematic dif'- 
ferences  by  age  among  individuals  in  their  preferences.  Michael 
(1979,  p. 41) used  the Bureau  of Labor Statistics' consumer  expendi- 
ture  survey  to  find  that  there  are  systematic  and  significant  dif'fer- 
ences  among  individuals'  consumption  proportions  by  age.  The 
classification  of  borrowers  and  lenders  by age  may not  be  the  most 
useful  for tracing the consequences  of' the wealth  redistribution.  We 
mention  it here  because  it is the only classification fOr which there  is 
evidence  that  individuals  are jointly  sorted  by desired  consumption 
proportions  and  debt  positions. 
There  are some other obvious sources of' wealth redistributions  that 
may be of sufficient  magnitude  to have caused  observed  output  fluc- 
tuations.  For  example,  unanticipated  changes  in  nominal  interest 
rates due  either  to real or to nominal  factors redistribute  wealth be- 
tween long-term  borrowers and lenders,  and this could be a source of' 
relative  price  variability.  Alternatively,  large  decreases  in  the  real 
value of' assets such as houses  and stocks can cause substantial redis- 
transftormation could  be made  here.  An essential  difference  is that our  model  of' Sec. 
IV  will  not  work  with  complete  endowment  insurance.  If' the  two  different  types  of' 
traders  have  perfectly  inspired  ea(h  other,  then  the  particular  realii~atio)n of'the  en(low- 
ment  distribution  will  not  affect  the  relative  wealth  position.  Simllilarly,  LIUnntiiI)ate( 
price  movemilents  will  have  no  real  effects  if' all  contracts  are  indlexed. 
1  See Friedmsan (1982).  By "%wealth"  we mean the value of total assets held  by  those 
who save.  Thus, while inside det)t  is not uLSually  considered  net wealth,  it is net wealth  to 
the consumers  who  are  saving.  If  those  people  who  pay the taxes to finance  government 
debt interest payments are the same as the holders of government  debt, then the wealth 
redistribution  will only  be associated  with inside  (lebt. 926  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
tributions  of' wealth  between  the  young  and  the  old.  Finally, exoge- 
nous  changes  in  the  productivity  of' capital could  be  the  cause  of' a 
change  in the  real value  of assets. 
C.  Relative  versus Aggregate  Demand  Shifts 
The  previous  discussion  may  obscure  some  of  the  difference  between 
our  model  and  aggregate  demand  models  of' the  business  cycle. To 
the extent  that changes  in aggregate  demand  cause wealth redistribu- 
tions  that  induce  employment  fluctuations,  there  is some  similarity 
between  our  model  and  aggregate  demand  models.  One  important 
difference,  however,  is that there  is no reason  in our  model  why the 
sign  of  the  aggregate  demand  shock  should  matter.  A large  unanti- 
cipated  inflation  can  cause  the  same  relative  price  shift  as  a  large 
unanticipated  deflation.  Hence  there is no presumption  that unanti- 
cipated  inflation  is expansionary  whereas  unanticipated  deflation  is 
contractionary.  To  a first approximation  (i.e.,  where  the  Walrasian 
equilibrium  total output  is independent  of  the  wealth  distribution), 
the  absolute  value  of  the  unanticipated  price  level  change  should  be 
negatively  correlated  with output  in our model.  Furthermore,  if' rela- 
tive  price  variability  is  an  independent  variable  explaining  output, 
then  unanticipated  inflation  should  have  little incremental  explana- 
tory power. 
Blejer and Leiderman  (1980)  and Fischer (1982) use innovations  in 
inflation and relative price variability as explanatory  variables for out- 
put.  Their  results  suggest  that each  variable has some  independent 
explanatory  power  for  output  in  the  post-World  War  II  United 
States. Fischer (1982,  fig. 3) and Sims (1980,  table 3) both find that in 
the  post-World  War II  period  positive  price  innovations  precede  a 
decrease in output.  We conclude  from  this evidence  that, in the post- 
World  War  II  period,  although  the  data  suggest  an  independent 
effect  of' price  innovations,  the  signs  are  the  reverse  of  those  pre- 
dicted by the models of Sargent,  Lucas, or Barro (see Barro [1981] for 
a survey of models  in which unanticipated  inflation causes an increase 
in output). 
The  period  before  World  War  II is likely  to  be  favorable  to  the 
unanticipated  inflation  model.  Sims (1980,  table 3) finds that negative 
price innovations  precede  decreases  in output  in the period  between 
World  War  I and  World  War  II.  Unfortunately,  we  have  not  been 
'-  jf course  in  a  Walrasian  model  it  is  possible  that  a  wealth  redistribution  from 
group  A  to  group  B  will  cause  an  expansion  of  output  while  the  revel-se  redistribution 
will  cause  a  contraction.  However,  we  prefer  to  maintain  the  presumption  that  the 
wealth  redistribution  has  no  effect  on  the  Walrasian  equilibrium. UNEMPLOYMENT  927 
able to find any evidence  that distinguishes  the relative price variabil- 
ity hypothesis  from the unanticipated  inflation  hypothesis  in that pe- 
riod. In the pre-World  War II period,  large unanticipated  deflation 
may  well  be  a  proxy  for  high  variability of  relative  prices.  This  is 
consistent  with the data of  tables 2 and  6 in Parks (1978). 
Thus  it seems  that further  empirical  research  is needed  to distin- 
guish  the  hypothesis  that  unanticipated  falls  in  money  (or  prices) 
decrease  output  from  the  hypothesis  that  monetary  or  price  level 
shocks of  any sign  decrease  output.  In addition,  further  theoretical 
research is required  to develop  models  in which the sign of the pub- 
licly observed shock, as well as its size, affects output.  One such contri- 
bution is that of Holmstrom  and Weiss (1982),  who suggest  that when 
individuals  confuse  idiosyncratic  and  aggregate  shocks,  as in  Lucas 
(1972),  the direction  of  aggregate  shocks  matters. 
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